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The majority also alludes to the petition-
er's affirmative responses to questions as 
to whether he had been advised of his 
rights, the nature of the charges against 
'him, and the consequences of his plea. But 
these responses beg the questions in issue: 
only if petitioner in fact understood the 
felony~murder doctrine, the nature of the 
charges against him, the fact that his plea 
made him eligible for capital punishment, 
and the extent of his constitutional rights 
could he have been competent to answer. 
In my view the petitioner has sufficiently 
alleged that his plea was involuntary and 
that he did not knowingly waive his rights. 
I believe he should be afforded a hearing 
to determine the truth of his allegations. 
Rehearing denied; PETERS, J., dissent 
ing. 
• o : m .UHIER mTEM 
T 
81 Cal.Rptr. 592 
June K. JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
H. F. AHMANSON & COMPANY et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
L. A. 29651. 
Supreme Court ot California, 
In Bank., 
Nov. 7, 1969. 
As Modified on De-nial of Rehellrinji!; 
Dec. 10, 1969. 
Minority stockholder's class action 
against holding company and present or 
former holders of stock of savings and loan 
association who had transferred a control 
block of shares in the association to the 
holding company, for breach of fiduciary 
responsibility. The Superior Court, Los 
Angeles County, Stevens Fargo, J.,. sus-
tained demurrers without leave to amend, 
and the minority stockholder appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Traynor, C. J" held 
that where the complaint did not seek re-
covery on behalf of the corporation for 
injuries to the corporation or for injury 
incidental to any injury to the corporation 
but for injury to herself and other minori-
ty stockholders, her suit was not derivative 
and could be maintained without meeting 
statutory requisites of derivative suit and 
without showing that injury was unique 
to her; and that the complaint that the 
majority shareholders fonned a new ,cor-
poration whose major asset was to be the 
control block of. association shares but from 
which minority stockholders were excluded, 
whereby the majority became holders of 
stock more marketable than the association 
shares, stated a cause of action. 
Judgment reversed with directions to 
overrule demurrer; cross appeal dismissed. 
McComb, J., dissented. 
Opinion, 76 CaJ.Rptr. 293, vacated. 
I. Building and Loan Associations P6(2) 
Where complaint of minority stock-
holder of savings and loan association 
against majority stockholders and holding 
company did not seek recovery on behalf 
of association for injuries to association or 
for injury incidental to any jnjury to asso-
ciation but for injury to herself and other 
minority stockholders, her suit was not 
derivative and could be maintained without 
meeting statutory requisites of derivative 
suit and without showing that injury was 
unique to her; disapproving in part Shaw 
v. Empire Savings & Loan Assn., 186 Cal. 
App.2d 401, 9 CaJ.Rptr. 204. West's Ann. 
Financial Code, § 7616. 
2. Corporations ~180 
Any use to which majority sharehold-
ers put corporation or their power to con-
trol corporation must benefit all share-
holders proportionately and must not con-
flict with proper conduct of corporation's 
business. West's Ann.F.inancial Code, § 
7616. 
3. Corporations ~180 
Rule as to fiduciary duty of majority 
stockholders is comprehensive rule of in-
herent fairness from viewpoint of corpora-
tion and those interested therein' and ap-
plies alike to officers, directors and con-
trolling shareholders in exercise 'of powers 
which are theirs by virtue of their position 
and to transactions wherein controlling 
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shareholders seek to gain advantage in Code, §§ 4100-4124, 4300, 4304, 4306, 4308, 
sale, transfer or use of their controlling 4310, 4311, 4600-4693; West's Ann.Finan-
block of shares. West's Ann.Financial cial Code, §§ 5066-5069, 5500,6400. 
Code, § 7616. 
4. BuildIng and Loan AI.oclatlon. ~6(2) 
Minority stockholder's complaint that 
defendant majority shareholders of savings 
and loan association formed new corpora-
tion whose major asset was to be control 
block 6f association shares but from which 
minority stockholders were excluded, 
whereby majority became holders of stock 
more marketable than association shares, 
stated cause of action. West's Ann.Finan-
cial Cnde, §§ 5066-5069, 5500, 6400. 
5. Building and Loan Associations ®:=I6(2) 
Majority shareholders who for their 
Own benefit -transferred their control block 
in savings -and loan association to holding 
company to create market for shares, ex-
cluding minority shareholders, breached 
fiduciary duty to minority by pledging con-
trol over association's assets and earnings 
to secure debt of holding company. West's 
Ann.Financial Code, §§ 5066-5069, 5500, 
6400. 
6. Corporation's ~180 
When no market exists for corporate 
stock j con~ro11ing sharehold,ers may not use 
their power to ,control corporation for pur-
pose of promoting marketing scheme which 
benefits themselves alone to detriment of 
minority. West's Ann.Financial Code. § 
7616. 
7. BuildIng and Loan As.oelatlons -(2) 
Where majority shareholders of close-
ly-held savings and loan association, to 
create ready market for shares, transferred 
control block to holding company, exclud-
ing minority shareholders, whereby control 
of association became asset of public hold-
ing company, position of minority share-
holder was changed and equities of situa-
tion required that she be allowed to elect 
to receive fair market value of her associa-
tion share on date of exchange or sum 
equivalent to derived block of holding com-
pany stock with -share of capital returned 
by holding company to its stockholders, 
with interest but reduced by adjustment on 
account of dividends. West's Ann.Corp. 
460 P.2d-30 
8. Monopolle. e:>28(6.2) 
No cause of action for restraint of 
trade under Cartwright Act or common-law 
principles was stated without allegation of 
purpose to restrain trade and of injury to 
business of plaintiff traceable to actions in 
furtherance of such purpose, or at least al-
legations from which purpose to eliminate 
competition might be inferred. West's 
Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 16720-16758, 
16726, 16756; West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. 
§ 452. 
9. Appeal and Error ~78(3) 
Although judgment from which de-
fendants appealed recited error in overrul-
ing demurter, order overruling demurrer 
remained interlocutory and nonappealable. 
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 904.1. 
10. BuildIng and Loan Assoelatlons _(2) 
Where majority shareholders' transfer 
of control block of savings and loan asso-
ciation to holding company occurred on 
May 14, 1959, first public offering of lat-
ter's stock and sale of debentures followed 
about June 10, 1960 and offer to minority 
stockholders was m,ade in September 1960. 
and hearings on application for exchange 
of holding _ company stock for minority 
stock were held in fall of 1961, delay of 
minority in initiating action in 1962 for 
breach of fiduciary duty was not so long 
as to be unreasonable, and where no preju-
dice 'was shown, action was not barred by 
laches. 
II. PartIe. ~80(5) 
PleadIng ~65 
In minority shareholder's action 
against holding company and present or 
former holders of savings and loan asso-
ciation stock who had transferred their 
control block of association stock to hold-
ing company, minority shareholder's defini-
tion of class she purported "to represent as 
"all of that portion of the other minority 
stockholders who are similarly situated who 
wish to rely thereon" and who agreed to 
share in litigation expense showed requi-
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site community of interest and readily as· 
certainable class, and demurrer based on 
objection to class definition was properly 
overruled. West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 
382. 
• 
Darling, Mack, Hall & Call and W. John 
Kennedy, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
Edward M. Raskin,Gerald E. Lichtig, 
Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp and Howard 
S. Smith, Los Angeles, for defendants and 
respondents. 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice. 
June K. Jones. the owner of 2S shares of 
the capital stock of United Savings and 
Loan Association of California brings this 
action on behalf of herself individually· 
and of all similarly situated minority stock~ 
holders of the Association. The defend-
ants are United Financial Corporation of 
California, fifteen individuals, and four 
corporations, all of whom are present or 
former stockholders or officers of the As-
sociation. Plaintiff seeks damages and 
other relief for losses allegedly suffered by 
the minority stockholders of the Associa-
tion because of claimed breaches of fidu-
ciary responsibility by defendants in the 
creation anc;l operation of United Financial, 
a Delaware holding company that owns 87 
percent of the outstanding Association 
stock. 
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment en-
tered for defendants after an order sustain-
ing defendants' general and special demur-
rers to her third amended complaint with-
out leave to amend. Defendants have filed 
a protective cross-appeal. We have con-
1. A California savings and loan association 
may be incorporated with shares, or stock, 
or both. (Fin. Code. §§ 51500, 6400.) 
Thus invf;stors in California a88OCiations 
are identified as shareholders, f. e., hold-
ers of withdrawable shares of the associa-
tion (Fin. Code, §§ 5066, 5067) or stock-
holders, i. e., holders of guarantee stock 
of the association (Fin. Code, §§ 5068, 
5(69). The principal distinctions be-
tween stock and shares of a savings and 
loan association are described in In re 
eluded that the allegations of the complaint 
and certain stipulated facts sufficiently 
state a cause of action and that the judg-
ment must therefore be reversed. 
The following facts appear from :the alle-
gations of the complaint and stipulation. 
United Savings and Loan A~sociation of 
California is a California .chartered sav-
ings and loan association that first issued 
stock on April 5, 1956.1 Theretofore it had 
been owned by its depositors, who, with 
borrowing members, elected the board of 
~ directors. No one depositor had sufficient 
voting power to control the Association. 
The Association issued 6,568 shares of 
stock on April 5, 1956. No additional stock 
has been issued. Of these shares, 987 
(14.8 percent) were purchased by deposi-
tors pursuant to warrants issued in propor-
tion to the amount of their deposits. Plain-
tiff was among these purchasers. The 
shares allocated to unexercised warrants 
were sold to the then chairman of the 
board of directors who later resold them to 
defendants and others. The stockholders 
have the right to elect a majority of the 
directors of the Association. 
The Association has retained the major 
part of its earnings in tax-free reserves 
with the result that the book value of the 
'outstanding shares has increased substan-
tially.· The shares were not actively· 
traded. This inactivity is attributed to the 
high book value, the ~losely held nature of 
the Association,3 and the failure of the 
management to provide investment in-
formation and assistance to shareholders, 
brokers; or the public. Transactions in 
the stock that did occur were primarily 
Pacific Ooost Bldg.-Loan Assn. of Los 
Angeles, 15 Cal.2d 134, 142, 99 P.2d 251. 
2. Between 1959 and 1966 the book value 
of each share increased from $1,131 to 
$4,143.70. 
3. H. F. Ahmanson & Co. acquired a ma-
jority of the shares in, May 1958. On 
May 14, 1959, the company owned 4,171 
of the outstanding shares. 
JONES .... H. F. AHMANSON" OOI!llPANY Cal. 467 
ctte as 460 P .2d 464 
-among existing stockholders. Fourteen sodation stock. More than 85 percent of 
of the nineteen defendants comprised 95 United Financial's consolidated earnings G 
percent of the market for Association" and book value of its shares reflected its 
shares prior to 1959. ownership of this Association stock. The 
In 1958 investor interest in shares of former majority stockholders of the As-
savings and loan associations and holding saciation had become the majority share-
companies increased. Savings and loan 
stocks that were publicly marketed enjoyed 
a steady increase in' market price there-
after until June 1962, but the stock of 
United Savings and Loan Association was 
not among them. Defendants determined 
to create a mechanism by which they could 
participate in the profit taking by attract-
. ing investor interest in the Association. 
They did not, however, undertake to rend-
er the Association shares more readily 
marketable. Instead, the United Financial 
. Corporation of California was incorporated 
in Delaware by all of the other defendants 
except defendant Thatcher on May 8,1959. 
On May 14, 1959, pursuant to a prior 
agreement, certain Association stock-
holders who among them owned a .majority 
of the Association stock exchanged their 
shares for those of United Financial, re-
ceiving a "derived block" of 250 United 
Financial shares for each Association 
share .. ' 
After the exchange, United Financial 
heJd· 85 percent of the outstanding As-
4. The number of shares in these derived 
blocks of United Financial stock was lat-
er modified by pro-rata surrenders and 
stock dividends in a series of transactions 
not pertinent here. 
5. The balance reflected United Financial's 
ownel'!'lhip of three insurance agencies and 
stock in a fourth. 
6. This distribution was equivalent to a 
$927.50 return of capital on each de-
rived block of shares. 
7. Rule 480 then provided: "Debentures, 
Notes and Evidences of Indebtedness, Un-
secured. Ordinarily an application for 
a permit to . sell and issue unsecured 
notes, evidences of indebtedness or deben-
tures by a n~w or comparatively inactive 
company will be . considered with dis-
favor: 
holders of United' Financial and contin-
ued to control the Association through the 
holding company. They did not offer the 
minority stockholders of the Association 
an opportunity to exchange their shares. 
The first public offering of United 
Financial stock was made in June 1960. 
To attract investor interest, 60,000 units 
were offered, each of which comprised two 
shares of United Financial stock and one 
$100, 5 percent interest-bearing, subordi-
nated, convertible debenture bond. The of-
fering provided that of the $7,200,000 re-
turn from the sale of these units, $6,200,000 
would be distributed immediately as a 
return of capital to the original share-
holders of United Financial, i. e.~ the 
former majority stockholders of the As-
sociation.s To obtain a permit from the 
California Corporations Commissioner for 
the sale, United Financial represented that 
the financial reserve requirement for 
debentl1re repayment established· by Com-
missioner's Rules 480 subdivision (a) and 
486" would be met by causing the Associ-
(8) If the issue creates indebtedness in 
excess of two times the tangible net worth 
of the issuer; 
.(b) Unless the issue provides for con-
tinued participation in the issuer on an 
equitable basis upon the redemption or 
retirement of the notes, evidences of in-
debtedness or debentures; 
(c) Unless estimated annual net earn~ 
hlgs are at least two times annual in-
terest and sinking fund or serial redemp-
tion requirements; 
(d) Unless the sinking fund or serial 
redemption requirements contemplate the 
retirement of the entire issue by date of 
maturity." 
'Rule 486 tllen provided: "Required 
Earnings and Sinking Fund. Ordinary 
average annual earnings, before taxes. 
for the five-year period preceding the 
issue, and for the year immediately pre-
ceding tile issue, or estimated earnings, 
should be .at least two times annual .in-
468 Cal. 460 PAOIFIO REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
atian to liquidate or encumber its income 
producing assets for cash that the Associ-
ation would then distribute to United 
Financial to service and retire the bonds.s 
In the Securities and Exchange Com'mis-
sion prospectus accompanying this first 
public offering, United Financial acknowl-
~dged that its prior earnings were not 
sufficient to service the debentures and 
noted that United Financial's direct earn-
ings would have to be augmented by divi-
dends from the Association. 
A public offering of 50,000 additional 
shares by United Financial with a sec-
ondary offering of 600,000 shares of the 
derived stock by the original investors 
was made in February 1961 for a total 
price of $15,275,000. The defendants sold 
568,190 shares of derived stock in this 
secondary offering, An underwriting 
syndicate of 70 brokerage finns partic-
ipated. The reSUlting nationwide publicity 
stimulated trading in the stock until, in 
mid-I96I, an average of 708.5 derived 
blocks were traded each month. Sales of 
Association shares decreased during this 
period from a rate of 170 shares per year 
before the fonnation of United Financial 
to half that number. United Financial 
acquired 90 percent of the Association 
shares that were sold. 
tercst requirements. Ordinarily average 
annual earnings. after taxes, and after 
giving effect to interest requirements on 
the proposed new security, for such five~ 
year period and for such year, or e8ti~ 
mnted earnings, should be at lenst two 
times sinking fund or serial redemption 
requirements. The sinking fund' or serinl 
redemption requirements . ordinarily 
should be 'based au n contemplated re-
tirement of substantially the entire issue 
by maturity.n 
The Commissioner has since adopted 
new rules. (Rules 260.140.4-0.) 
8. Plaintiff alleges at Paragraph V (C) (3) 
of 'her complaint that United Financial 
represented to the Corporations Commis-
sioner that: uThe financial reserves for 
debenture repayment required by the 
Commissioner's Rules 48O(a) and 486 
would be satisfied by having United 
Financial exercise its control to cause 
Shortly after the first public offering 
of United Financial shares, defendants 
caused United Financial to offer to pur~ 
chase up to 350 shares of Association stock 
for $1,100 per share. The book value of 
each of these shares was $1,411.57, and 
earnings were $301.15 per share. The 
derived blocks of United Financial shares 
then commanded an aggregate price of 
$3,700 per. block exclusive of the $927.50 
return of capital. United Financial ac· 
quired an additional 130 shares of As-
sociation stock as a result of this offer. 
In 1959 and 1960 extra dividends of 
$75. and $57 per share had been paid by 
the Association, but in December 1960, 
after the foregoing offer had been made, 
defendants caused the Association's presi-
dent to noti fy each minority stockholder 
by letter that no dividends other than the 
regular $4.00 per share annual dividend 
would be paid in the near future. The 
Association president, defendant M. D. 
Jameson, was then a director of both the 
Association and United Financial. 
Defendants then proposed an exchange 
of United Financial shares for Association 
stock. Under this proposal each minority 
stockholder would have received approxi-
mately 51 United Financial shares of a 
total value of $2,400 for each Association 
share. When the application for a permit 
the ASSOCIATION to liquidate or en-
cumber its income -producing assets for 
cash and then CRuse the ASSOCIATION 
to distribute the cash to United Financial 
in order to service and retire the deben-
tures." Defendants dispute plaintiff's 
interpretation of United Financial's rep-
resentations. They claim that United 
Financial tlid no more than promise to 
liquidate its own assets, i. e., the Associa-
tion stock that it owned, and distribute 
those assets to service the debt. On ap-
peal from a judgment entered after a 
demurrer bas been sustained, a reviewing 
court must Rccept all properly pleaded 
allegations not iI\consisteilt with other 
nl1egations as true. (Stigall v. City of 
Taft, 58 Cn1.2d 565, 567, 25 Cnl.Rptr. 
441, 375 P.2<1 289; Katenkamp v. Union 
Realty Co., 6 Cnl.2d 765, 769, 59 P.2d 
473.) No dispute can exist as to the 
interpretation of the nlJegntion of the 
complaint here in question. 
• 
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was filed with the Cali fomia 'Corporations vantage to the detriment of the minority 
Commissioner on August 28, 1961, the value when they -created United Financial, made 
of the derived bloCks of United Financial a public market for its shares that rendered 
shares received by defendants in the initial Association stock 'unmarketable except to 
exchange had risen to approximately $8,. United Financial, and' then refused either 
BOO." The book value of the Association to purchase plaintiff's Association' stock at 
stock was in excess of $1,700 per share, a fair price or exchange the stock on the 
and the shares wefe earning at an annual same basis afforded to the majority. She 
rate of $615 per share. Each block of 51 further alleges that they also created a con· 
United Financial shares had a book value fliet of interest that might have been avoid-
of only $210 and earnings of $134 per year, ed had they <lffered all Association stock· 
85 percent of which' reflected Association holders - the opportunity to participate in 
earnings. At the hearings held on the ap- the initial exchange of shares.. Finally, 
plication by the Commissioner, representa- plaintiff contends'that the defendants' acts 
tives of United Financial justified the high. constituted a' restraint of trade in violation 
er valuation of United Financial shares of Common law and statutory antitrust laws. 
on the ground thal,they were highly mar· 
ketable, whereas Association stock was un~ 
marketable and poor collateral for loans. 
Plaintiff and other minority stockholders 
objected to the proposed exchange, contend· 
ing that the plan was not fair, just, and 
equitable. Defendants then asked the Com· 
missioner to abandon the application with· 
out ruling 'on it. 
Plainti ff contends that in following this 
course of conduct defendants breached the 
fiduciary duty owed by majority or con~ 
trolling shareholders to' minority share~ 
holders. She alleges that they used their 
control of the Association for their own ad~ 
9. The derived block sold for as much as 
$13.127.41 during 1960-1961. On Jan· 
uary 30, 1962, the (lnte upon which plain-
tiff eommeneell this nction, the menn 
value was $9.116.o..~.' ' 
10. Section 7616 provides: "Xo action may 
be instituted Or mnintninell in the ri$ht 
of any association by any sbareholder' or 
certificate holder, as such. Such action 
may not be instituted or maintained by 
a stockholder of any association, unless 
all of the fonowing conditions exist: 
"(1) The plaintiff allegeM in the com-
plaint thnt h~ was a registered stock-
holder at the ·time of the transaction or 
any -part thereof of -which he complains 
or thnt his stock thereafter devolved upon 
him by operation of law from a holder 
who was a holder at the time of the 
transaction or any part thereof complain-
ed of. 
"(2) The plaintiff alleges in the com-
plaint with particularity' his efforts to 
I 
Plaintiff'S Capacity 10 Sue 
[1] . We are' faced at the outset with 
defendants' contention that iJ a cause of 
action is stated, it is derivative in' 'nature 
since any injury suffered is common to all 
minority stockholders of the Association. 
Therefore, defendants urge, plaintiff may 
not sue in an individtlal capacity or on be-
half of a class made up of stockholders 
. excluded 'from the United Financial ex-' 
change, and in any case may not maintain a 
derivative action without complying with 
Financial Code, secHo,n 7616.1.0 ··Defendan~s 
secure 'from the board of directors such 
action as he ,desires and alleges further 
thot he has either informed the associa-
tion or such boord of directors in writing 
of the ultimate filets of each cause of 
action against each defendant director or 
delivered to the association or such board 
of directors a true copy of the complaint 
which he 'proposes to file, nnd the reaSOns 
for his failure to obtain such action or 
the reason for not making such effort. 
"(3) The commissioner shall have de-
termine(l. 'after a hearing upOn at least· .. 
20 dayk' written notice to sueh assocla-
tion anll eoeb of its directors, that such 
nction (0) is proposed in good faith and 
(b) there is rensonable possibility that 
the prosecution of such action will benefit 
the association and. its stockholders. 
"Subdivisions (b) and' (c) of Section 
834 of the Corporations Code shall be 
applicable in the case of any such action." 
470 Cal. 460 PAOIFIO REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
invoke Shaw v. Empire Savings & Loan 
Assn., 186 Cal.App.2d 401, 9 CaI.Rptr. 204. 
There the defendant majority stockholder, 
who controlled the board bf directors, had 
the bylaws amended to delete a provision 
granting preemptive rights and thereafter 
caused the Association to issue shares to 
himsel f at less than market or book value, 
thus diluting plaintiff minority stockhold-
er's interest. Plaintiff sought a dec1ara~ 
tion that he was entitled to maintain his 
proportionate interest in the Association 
either through purchase of a proportionate 
number of shares from the buyer or issu-
ance of a proportionate number of addi-
tional shares to him by the Association on 
the same tenns. The Court of Appeal 
concluded that inasmuch as the injury to 
the plaintiff was no different from that 
caused other minority stockholders, relief 
was available only in a derivative action. 
Analysis of the nature and purpose of a 
shareholders' derivative suit will demon-
strate that the test adopted in the Shaw 
case does not properly distinguish the cases 
in which an individual cause of action lies. 
A shareholder's derivative suit seeks to 
recover for the benefit of the corporation 
and its whole body of shareholders when 
injury is caused to the corporation that may 
not otherwise be redressed because of 
failure of the corporation to act. Thus, 
"the action is derivative, i. e., in the cor-
porate right, if the gravamen -of the com-
plaint is injury to the corporation, or to the 
whole body of its stock or property without 
any severance or distribution among in-
dividual holders, or if it seeks to recover as-
sets for the corporation or to prevent the 
dissipation of its assets." (Gagnon Co., 
Inc. v. Nevada Desert Inn, 45 C.1.2d 448, 
453, 289 P.2d 466, 471; Sutter v. General 
Petroleum Corp" 28 CaI.2d 525, 530, 170 
P.2d 898, 167 A.L.R. 271; see Ballantine & 
Sterling, California Corporation Laws (4th 
ed. 1968) 168B.) "A stockholder's deriva-
tive suit is brought to enforce a cause of 
action which the corporation itself possess-
es against some third party. a suit to rec-
ompense the corporation for injuries which 
it has suffered as a result of the acts of 
third parties. The, management owes to the 
stockholders a duty to take proper steps 
to enforce all claims which the corporation 
may have. When it fails to perform this 
duty, the stockholders have a right to do 
so, Thus, although the corporation is made 
a defendant in a derivative suit, the cor-
poration nevertheless is the real plaintiff 
'and it alone benefits from the decree; 
the stockholders derive -no benefit there-
from except the indirect benefit resulting 
from a realization upon the corporation's 
assets. The stockholder's individual suit, 
on the other hand, is a suit to enforce a 
right against the corporation which the 
stockholder possesses as an individual." 
(Rules of Civ.Proc. for U. S. District 
Courts, Advisory Committee Notes (1966) 
H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
40.) 
It is clear from the stipulated facts and 
plaintiff's allegations that she does not seek 
to recover on behalf of the corporation 
for injury done to the corporation by de-
fendants. Although she does allege that the 
value of her stock has been diminished by 
defendants' actions, she does not contend 
that the_ diminished value reflects an in jury 
to the corporation and resultant deprecia-
tion in the value of the stock Thus the 
gravamen of her cause of action is injury 
to herself and the other minority stock-
holders. 
In Shaw v. Empire Savings & Loan 
Assn., supra, 186 Cal.App.2d 401, 9 Cal. 
Rptr. 204, the court noted the "well estab-
lished general rule that a stockholder of 
a corporation has no personal or individual 
right of action against third persons, in-
cluding the corporation's officers and di-
rectors, for a wrong or injury to the cor-
poration which results in the destruction 
or depreciation of the value of his stock, 
since the wrong thus suffered by the stock-
holder is merely incidental to the wrong 
suffered by the corporation and affects all 
stockholders alike." (186 CaI.App.2d 401, 
407, 9 Cal.Rptr. 204, 208.) From this the 
court r'easoned that a minority shareholder 
could not maintain an individual action 
unless he could demonstrate the injury to 
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him was somehow different from that suf- The extensive reach of the duty of con-
fered by other minority shareholders. (186 trolling shareholders and directors to the 
Ca1.App.2d 401, 408, 9 Ca1.Rptr. 204.) In corporation. and its other shareholders was 
so concluding the court erred.. The indi- described by the Court of Appeal in Remil-
vidual wrong necessary to support a suit by lard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini, supra, 
a shareholder need not be unique to that 109 Ca1.App.2d 405, 241 P 2d 66, where, 
plaintiff.ll The same injury may affect quoting from the opinion of the United 
a substantial number of shareholders., If States Supreme Court in Pepper v. Litton, 
the injury is not incidental to an injury 308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281, the 
to the corporation, -an individual cause of court held,: "'A director is a fiduciary. 
action exists. To the extent that Shaw *, • • So is a dominant or controlling 
v. Empire Savings & Loan Assn. is incon- stockholder or group of stockholders. * * 
sistent with the opinion expressed herein, Their powers are powers in trust. • • • 
it is disapproved. Their dealings with the _ corporation are 
II 
Majority Shareholders' Fiduciary 
Responsibility 
[2] Defendants take the position that as 
shareholders they owe no fiduciary obliga-
tion to other shareholders, absent reliance 
on inside information, use of corporate as-
sets, or fraud. This view has long been 
repudiated in California. The Courts of. 
of Appeal. have often recognized that ma-· 
jority shareholders, either singly or acting 
in concert to accomplish a joint, purpose, 
have a fiduciary responsibility tp the mi-
nority and to" the corporation to use their 
ability to control the, corporation in a fair, 
just, and equitable maimer. Majority 
shareholders may not use their power to 
control ~orporate activities to benefit them-
selves alone or in a manner detrimental 
to "the minority. "Any use to which they 
put the corporation or their power to con-
trol the corporation ,must benefit all share-
holders proportionately and must not con-
flict with ,the proper conduct Qf the cor-
poration's business. (Brown v. ;Halbert, 
271 A.C.A. 307, 316, 76 Ca1.Rptr. r~i; 
Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Ca1.App.2d 828, 47 
Ca1.Rptr. 392; Efron. v. Kalmanovitz, ~ 
Ca1.App2d 546, 38 Ca1.Rptr. 148; Remil-
lard 'Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini" 109 
Ca1.App.2d 405, 241 P.2d 66.) 
II. See Note. 49 Cal.L.Rev. Ml, criticizing 
the result in Shaw and pointing out that 
the rule" espoused by the Court of Ap-
peal would leave the shareholder whose 
subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where 
any of their contracts or engagements with 
the corporation is challenged the burden is 
on the director or stockholder not only 
to prove the good faith of the transaction 
but also to show its inherent fairness from 
the viewpoint of the corporation and those 
interested therein. * * * The essence 
of the test is whether or not under all the 
circumstances the transaction carries the 
earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If 
it does not, equity will set it aside.' Re-
ferring directly to the duties, of a director 
the court stated * '* * : 'He who is in 
such a fiduciary position cannot serve 
himself first and his cestuis second. He 
cannot manipulate the affairs of his cor-
poration to their detriment and in disregard 
of the standards of common decency and 
honesty. He cannot by the intervention of 
a corpora~e entity violate the ancient pre-
cept against serving two masters. He can-
not by the use of the corporate device 
avail himself of privileges nonnally per-
mitted butsiders in a race of creditors. 
Jfe cannot utilize his inside infonnation 
and his strategic position for his own 
pteferm~nt: He cannot violate rules of 
fair play by doing indirectly through the 
c~rporaiion what he could n~t do directly. 
lie cannot use his power for his personal 
, 
advantage and to the detriment of the 
stockholders and creditors no matter how 
injury was not unique without a remedy 
if the corporation was not also injured 
by the same wrongful conduct. 
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absolute in terms that power may be and 
no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy 
technical requirements. For that power 
is at all times subject to the equitable 
limitation that it may not be exercised for 
the aggrandizement, preference, or ad· 
vantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion 
or detriment of the cestuis. Where there 
is a violation of these principles, equity 
will undo the wrong or intervene to pre-
vent its consummation.' This is the law of 
California." (109 Ca1.App.2d 405, 420--421, 
241 P.2d 66, 75.) In RemiUard the Court 
of Appeal clearly indicated that the fiduci-
ary obligations of directors and share-
holders are neither limited to specific 
statutory duties and avoidance of fraudu-
lent practices nor aTe they owed solely to 
the -corporation to the exclusion of other 
shareholders. 
Defendants assert, however, that in the 
use of their own shares they owed no fi-
duciary duty to the minority stockholders 
of the Association. They maintain that 
they made full disclosure of the circum-
stances surrounding the -formation of Un,it-
ed Financial, that the creation of United 
Financial and its share offers in no way 
affected the control of the Association, that 
plaintiff's proportionate interest in the As~ 
sociation was not affected, that the Asso~ 
ciation was not harmed, and that the mark~ 
et for Association stock was not affect-
ed. Therefore, they conclude, they have 
breached no fiduciary duty to plainti ff and 
the other minority stockholders. 
Defendants would have us retreat from a 
position demanding equitable treatment of 
all shareholders by those exercising control 
over a corporation to a philosophy much 
criticized by commentators and modified 
by courts in other jurisdictions as well as 
our own. In essence defendants suggest 
that we reaffirm the so:..called "majority" 
rule reflected in our early decisions. This 
rule, exemplified by the decision in Ryder 
v. Bamberger, 172 Cal. 791, 158 P. 753 but 
since severely limited, recognized the 
"perfect right [of majority shareholders] 
to dispose of their stock * * * without 
the slightest regard to the wishes and de-
sires or knowledge of the minority stock-
holders; • • ." (I'. 806, 158 P. p. 759) 
and held that such fiduciary duty as did 
exist in officers and directors was to the 
corporation only. The duty of shareholders 
as such was not recognized unless they, like 
officers and directors, by virtue of their 
position were possessed of information rel-
ative to the value of the corporation's 
shares that was not available to outside 
shareholders. In such case' the existence 
'of special facts permitted a finding that a 
fiduciary relationship to the corporation 
and other shareholdtrs existed. (Hobart 
v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 159 
P.2d 958.) 
[3] We had occasion to review these 
theories as well as the "minority rule" that 
directors and officers have an obligation 
to shareholders individually not to profit 
from their official position at the share-
holders' expense in American Trust Co. v. 
California etc. Ins. Co., 15 Cal.2d 42, 98 
P.2d 497. Each of the traditional rules has 
been applied under proper circumstances 
to enforce the fiduciary obligations of cor-
porate officers and directors to their cestuis. 
(Lawrence v. 1. N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 
Cal.2d 220, 100 P.2d 765 [directors may not 
engage in any transaction that will con-
flict with their duty to the shareholders 
or make use of their power or of the cor-
porate property for their own advantage] ; 
Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 
Cal.2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 [officer must dis-
close knowledge of corporate business to 
shareholder in transaction involving trans- . 
fer of stock]; In re Security Finance Co., 
49 Cal.2d 370, 317 P.2d. 1 [majority share-
holders' statutory powers subject to equita-
ble limitation of good _ faith and inherent 
fairness to minority].) The rule that has 
developed in California is a comprehensive 
ruie of "inherent fairness from the view-
point of the corporation and those interest-
ed therein." (Remillard Brick Co. v. Re-
millard-Dandini, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d 405, 
420, 241 P.2d 66, 75. See also, In re Se-
curity Finance Co., supra, 49 Cal.2d 370, 
317 P.2d 1; Brown v. Halbert, supra, 271 
A.CA. 307, 76 Cal.Rptr. 781; Burt v. 
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Irvine Co., supra, 237 CaI.App.2d 828, honest dealing. And while it is often dif-
47 Cal.Rptr. 392; Efron v. Kalrnanov~tzJ ficult to discover self-dealing in mergers, 
supra, 226 Cal.App.2d 546, 38 CaI.Rptr. consolidations, sale of aU the assets or dis-
148.) The rule applies alike to officers, solution and liquidation, the difficulty 
directors, ,and controlling shareholders in makes it eveD more imperative that the 
the exercise of powers that afe theirs by search be thorough and relentless." Lat-
virtue of their position and to transactions tin, Corporations (1959) 565.) 
wherein controlling shareholders seek to 
gain an advantage in the sale or transfer 
or use of their controlling block of shares. 
Thus we held i.J;t -In re Security Finance, 
supra, 49 CaL2d370, 317 P.2d I, that ma-
jority shareholders do not have a1) absolute 
right to dissolve a corporation, although ,. 
ostensibly permitted to do so by Corpora-
tions Code, section 4600, because their stat-
utory power is subject to equitable limi- . 
tations in favor of the minority. We rec-
ognized that the majority had the right to 
dissolve the corporation to protect their 
investment if no alternative means were 
available, and no advantage was secured 
over other shareholders, and noted that 
uthere is -nothing sacred in the life of a 
corporation that transcends the interests of 
its shareholders, but because dissolution 
falls with such finality on those interests, 
above all corporate powers it is s,ubject to 
equitable limitations." (49 Cal.2d 370, 377, 
317 P.2d I, 5.) 
The increasingly complex transactions 
of the business and financial communities 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the tradi-
tional theories of fiduciary obligation as 
tests of majority shareholder responsibility 
to the minority. These theories have failed 
to afford adequate protection to minority 
shareholders and particularly to those in 
closely held corporations whose disadvan-
tageous and often precarious position ren-
ders them particularly vulnerable to the 
vagaries of the majority. Although courts 
have recognized the potential for, abuse or 
unfair advantage when a controlling share-
holder sells his shares at a premium over 
investment value (Perlman v. Feldmann, 
219 F.2d 173, 50 A.L.R.2d 1134 [premium 
paid for con,trol over allocation of produc-
tion in time of shortage]; Gerdes v. Rey-
nolds, Sup., 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 [sale of con-
trol to looters or incompetents] j Porter v. 
Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428; Brown v. 
Halbert, supra, 271 A.c.A. 307, 76 Ca1.Rptr. 
The extension of fiduciary obligations to 781 [sale of only controlling shareholder's 
controlling shareholders in their exercise f shares to purchaser offering to buy as-
of corporate powers and dealings with their . sets of corporation or all shares]) or in a 
shares is J;lot a recent development. The controlling shareholder's use of control to 
-Circuit Court for the Southern District of avoid equitable distribution of corporate as-
New York said in 1886 that "when a num- sets (Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation 
ber of stockholders combine to constitute (3rd Cir. 1946) 162 F.2d 36, 172 A.L.R. 
. themselves a majority in order to control 495 [use of control to cause subsidiary to 
the corporation, as they see fit, they become redeem stock prior to liquidation and dis-
for all practical purposes the corporation tribution of assets]), no comprehensive rule 
itself, and assume the trust relation occu- has emerged in other jurisdictions. Nor 
pied _,by the corporation towards its stock- have most commentators approached the 
holders." (Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & ·Nav. problem from a perspective other, than 
Co. (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625, 631.) that of the advantage gained in the sale of 
Professor Lattin has suggested that "the control. Some have suggested that the 
power'to controi, or rather its use, should price paid for control shares over their 
be considered in no lesser light than that investment value be treated as an asset 
of a trustee to deal with the trust estate belonging to the corporation itself (Berle 
and with the beneficiary. Self-dealing in and Means, The Modem Corporation and 
whatever form it occurs should be han- Private Property (1932) p. 243), or as an 
dIed with rough hands for what it is--<1is- asset that should be shared proportionately 
460 P.2d-301fa 
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with all shateholders through a general 
offer (Jennings, Trading in Corporate Con-
trol (1956) 44 Ca1.L.Rev. 1,39), and anoth-
er contends that the sale of control at a pre-
mium is always evil (Bayne, The Sale-of-
Control Premium: the Intrinsic Illegiti-
macy (1969) 47 Tex.L.Rev. 215). 
The additional potential for injury to 
minority shareholders from majority deal-
ings in its control power apart from sale 
has not gone unrecognized, however. The 
ramifications of defendants' actions here 
are not unlike those described by Professo,r 
. Gower as occurring when control of one 
corporation is acquired by another through 
purchase of less than all of the shares of 
the latter: "The [acquired] company's ex-
istence is- not affected, nor need its con-
stitution be altered; all that occurs is that 
its shareholders change. From the legal 
viewpoint this methodological distinction is 
formidable, but commercially the two things 
may be almost identical. If • • • a 
controlling interest' is acquired, the [ac-
quired] company * * * will become a 
subsidiary of the acquiring company * * 
and cease, in fact though not in law, to be 
an independent entity. 
"This may produce the situation in which 
a small number of dissentient members are 
left as a minority in a company intended 
to be operated as a member of a group. 
As such, their position is likely to be un-
happy, for the parent company will wish to 
operate the subsidiary for the benefit of 
the group as a whole and not necessarily 
for the benefit of that particular sub-
sidiary." (Gower, The Principles of 
Modern Company l.aw (2d ed. 1957 p. 
561).) Professor Eisenberg notes that as 
the purchasing corporation's proportionate 
interest in the acquired corporation ap-
proaches 100 percent, the market for the 
latter's stock disappears, a problem that is 
12. Contrary to defendants' Suggestion that 
Christophides v. Porco, (S.D.N.Y.) 289 
F. SupP. 403 provides suppert for their 
argument that they owe no fiduciary duty 
to the minority and may - act with im-
punity to cause a dimunition in the value 
of minority shares, the district court 
noted that although such conduct did not 
aggravated if the acquiring corporation for 
its own business purposes reduces or elimi-
nates dividends. (Eisenberg, The Legal 
Role of Shareholders and Management in 
Modern Corporate Decision-II1i'king (1969) 
57 Cal.L.Rev. I, 132. See also, O'Neal and 
Derwin, ExpUlsion or Oppression of Busi-
ness Associates (1961) passim; Leech, 
Transactions in Corporate Control (1956) 
104 U.Pa.L.Rev. n5, 728; Comment, The 
Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Share-
holder to the Minority Shareholders (1958) 
9 Hastitlgs'L]:' 306, 314.) The case before 
us, in which no 'sale or transfer of actual 
control is directly involved, demonstrates 
that the injury anticipated by these authors 
can be inflicted with impunity under the 
traditional rules and supports our con-
clusion that the comprehensive rule of good 
faith and inherent fairness to the minority 
in any transaction where control ,of the 
corporation is material properly governs 
controlling shareholders in this state.12 
We tum now to defendants' conduct to 
ascertain whether this test is met. 
III 
Formation of United Financial and 
Marketing its Shares 
[4) Defendants created United Finan-
cial during a period of .unusual investor 
interest in the stock 'of savings and loan 
associations. They then owned a majority 
of the outstanding stock of the Association. 
This stock was not readily marketable 
owing to a high book value, lack of investor 
information and facilities, and the closely 
held nature of the Association. The 
.management of the Association had made 
no effort to create a market for the stock 
or to split the shares and reduce their 
market price to a more attractive level. 
Two courses were available to -defendants 
in their effort to exploit the bull market 
violate the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934, § 10(b). 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) , 
the charge might have significance "in 
respect of some sort of state-created claim 
for fiduciary breach" over which that 
court lacked jurisdiction. (289 F.Supp. 
ot 407.) 
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in savitigs and loan stock. Both were 
made possible by defendants' status as 
controlling stockholders. The first was 
either to cause the Association to effect a 
stock split (Corp.Code, § 1507) and create 
a market for the Association stock or to 
create a holding company for Association 
'shares and permit all stockholders to ex-
change their shares before offering hold-
ing company shares to the public. All 
stockholders would have benefited alike 
had this been dorie, but in realizing their 
gain on the sale of their.stock.t~JIlajority. 
stockholders would of necessity have haa 
to relinquish some of their control shares. 
Because a public market would have ,been 
created, however, the minority stockholders 
would have been able to extricat~ them-
selves without sacrificing their investment 
had they elected not to remain with the 
Dew management. 
13. The situation of minority stockholders 
and the difficulties they faced in attempt-
ing to market their 'savings and loan stock 
were described in The Savings and Loan 
Industry in California, a report pre~ 
pared by the Stanford Research Institute 
for the California Savings and Loan 
Commissioner, and published by the Com-
missioner in 1960. The attractiveness of 
the holding company as ,8 device to en-
hance liquidity was recognized: "The 
majority and minority' stockholders in 
the original associations often found that 
they had difficulties in seIJing their 
shares at a price approximating their 
book value. Their main difficulties arose 
from the fact that book values and 
prices of shares often ran into many thou-
sands of dollars, a price not generally 
suitable for wide public sale. These 
shares were usually owned by a relatively 
small number of stockholders. When one 
of them, or his heirs, wished to sell his 
shares, he had to negotiate with a buyer 
in this small group or attempt to find 
an outside purchaser. Minority stock~ 
holders had a special problem, because 
they could not sell control, with their 
stock. 
''The holding company was regarded by 
many stockholders' a'l!J an attractive device 
to solve the problem of the marketability 
of their shares. Through this method, 
the control 'of one, two, or several as-
sociations could be consolidated and of-
'fered to the investing public in a single 
large stock issue ,at relatively low prices, 
The second course was that taken by de-
fendants. A new corporation -was formed 
whose major asset was to be the control 
block of Association stock owned by de-
fendants', but from which minority share-
holders were to be excluded. The unmar-
ketable Association stock held by the ma-
jority was transferred to the newly form-
ed corporation at an exchange rate equival-
ent to a 250 for 1 stock split. Thenew 
corporation thereupon set out to create a 
market for its own shares. Association 
stock constituted 85 percent of the holding 
company's assets and produced an equival-
ent proportion of its income. The same in-
dividuals controlled both corporations. It 
appears therefrom that the market created 
by defendants for United Financial shares 
was a market that would have been avail-
able for Association stock had defendants 
taken the first course of action.13 
either over the counter or through a 
stock exchange. The wide public owner-
ship of holding company shares would 
thus provide a more active market and 
more protection against large capital 
losses in the event the original owners 
or their heirs wished to sell their hold-
ing company stock. 
" ... 
"Large capital gains on the sale of hold-
ing companY stock to the public have 
been ,an important ineentive and conse-
quence of this form Qf organization. The 
issuance of holding company stock to the 
general public usually found an enthu-
siastic demand which made it- possible 
to sell the stock for as much as two to 
three times book value. In many but 
not all cases, the majority stockholders 
in the original associations have offered 
less than 50 percent of the holding com-
pany's stock to the public, thus retaining 
control of 'the association and the holding 
companies." (The Savings and Loan In-
dustry in California (1960) pp. VI-6-
VI-7.) Although defendants suggest that 
their transfer of the insurance businesses 
, and the later acquisition of another sav-
ings and loan association by United Fi-
nancial were necessary to the creation 
of a market for United Financial shares 
and that no market could be created for 
the shares of a single savings nnd loan 
association, the study does not support 
their claim. 'Vhether defendants could 
have created a market for a holding com-
pany that controlled a fringle association 
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After United Financial shares became 
available to the public it became a virtual 
certainty that no equivalent market could 
or would be created for Association stock. 
United Financial had become the control~ 
ling stockholder and neither it nor the oth-
er defendants would benefit from public 
trading in Association stock in competition 
with United Financial shares. Investors af-
forded an opportunity to acquire United 
Financial shares would not be likely to 
choose the less marketable and expensive 
-Association stock in preference. Thus de- . 
fendants chose a course of action in which 
they used their control of the Association 
to. obtain an advantage not made available 
to all stockholders.. They <lid so without 
regard to the resulting detriment to the 
minority stockholders and in the absence 
of any compelling business purpose. Such 
conduct is not consistent with thei r duty of 
good faith and inherent fairness to the mi-
nority stockholders. Had defendants af-
forded the minority an opportunity to ex-
change their stock on the same basis or 
offered to purchase them at a price arrived 
at by independent appraisal, their burden of 
establishing good faith and inherent fair-
ness would have been much less. At the 
trial they may present evidence tending to 
show such good faith or compelling busi-
ness purpose that would render their action 
fair under the circumstances. On appeal 
from the judgment of dismissal a fter the 
defendants' demurrer was sustained we de-
cide only that the complaint states a cause 
of action ,entitling plaintiff to ~e1ief. 
[5] Defendants gained an additional 
advantage for themselves through their use 
of control of the Association when they 
pledged that control over the Association's 
assets and earnings to secure the holding 
or reasonably' believed ,that they could 
not, goes to their good faith and to the 
existence of a proper business purpose 
for electing the course that they chose to 
follow. At the trial of the cause defend· 
ants cnn introduce evidence relevant to 
the necessity for inclusion of other busi· 
nesses. 
14. Should it become necessary to encumber 
or liquidate Association assets to servi('e 
this debt or to depart from a dividend 
company's debt, a debt that had been incur-
red for their own benefit." In so doing the 
defendants breached their fiduciary obli-
gation to the minority once again and 
caused United Financial and its controlling 
shareholders to become inextricably wedded 
to a conflict of interest between the minor-
ity stockholders of each corporation. Al-
ternatives were available to them that 
would have benefited all stockholders pro-
portionately. The course they chose affect-
ed the minority stockholders with no less 
finality than does dissolution (In re Secu-
rity Finance, supra, 49 Ca1.Zd 370, 317 P 2d 
1) and demands no less concern for minor-
ity interests. 
[6] In so holding we do not suggest 
that the dudes of corporate fiduciaries in-
clude in all cases an obligation to make a 
market for and to facilitate public trading 
in the stock of the corporation. But when, 
as here, no market exists, the controlling 
sharehoiders may not use their power to 
control the corporation for the purpose of 
promoting a marketing scheme that bene-
fits themselves alone to the detriment of the 
minority. Nor do we suggest that a control 
block of shares may not be sold or transfer-
red to a holding company. We decide only 
that the circumstances of any transfer of 
controlling shares will be subject to judicial 
scrutiny when it appears that the control-
ling shareholders may have breached their 
fiduciary obligation to the corporation or 
the remaining shareholders. 
IV 
Damages 
[7] Plaintiff contends that she should 
have been afforded the opportunity to ex-
policy consistent with the business needs 
of the Association, damage to the As· 
sociation itself may occur. We need not 
resolve here, but note with some concern, 
the problem facing United Financial, 
which owes the same fiduciary duty to its 
own sl18reholders as to those of the As-
sociation. Any decision regarding use of 
Association RSsets and earnings to sen'· 
ice the holding company debt must be 
made in the context of these potentially 
conflicting interests. 
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change her stock for United Financial Association stockholders thereafter. In 
shares at the time of a'rid on the same basis short, the enterprise into which the minority 
as the niajority exchange. She therefore stockholders were now locked was not that 
proposes that upon tender of her Associa- in which they had invested. 
tion stock to the defendants she be- awarded 
the fair' market value of a derived block 
of United Financial shares during 1%0-
1962 plus interest -from the date of her ac-
tion as well as a return of capital of $927.-
50 plus interest ftom the date the same was 
made to the former "~ajority shareholders. 
In addition she seeks ,exe~plary ~amages 
and other relief. " r 
Defendants, on the other hand, claim that 
plaintiff seeks a IIfree ride" after they have 
taken ,all of the risks in creating United 
Financial and marketing its stock. They 
maintain that plaintiff has not been dam-
aged by their conduct and that they have 
breached no duty owed to plaintiff and the 
other minority stockholders. We are thus 
without guidance from defendants as to the 
remedy that a court of, equity might appro-
priately fashion-in these tireumstances.-
From the perspective of the minority 
stockholders o-f the Association, the transfer 
of contr~l under these circJlmst~nces to 
another corporation and the resulting im-
pact on their positi~n as minority stock-
holders accomplished a fundamental cor-
porate change as to them. ,Control of a 
closely held savings and loan association, 
the major portion of whose earnings had 
~en retained over a l~ng period while its 
stockholders remained stable, became an a~­
set of a publicly held holding company. 
The._positic;m of th~ minority shareholder 
was drastically' changed thereby:! His 
pract,ical ability to influence c(>rpora~e de-
cisionmaking was diminished, ~~bs~antil~p~ , 
when control was transferred to -a publicly' 
he1d.corporation that was in 'turn controlled 
by the owners of more than 750,000 
shares.11f The· future business goals of the 
Association could reasonably be' expetted to 
reflect the needs and interest';{ the hold~ 
iog company rather than the aims of the 
15. - Although the B. F. AhmaD80D &; '00. 
owned 0. majority of the Association 
&t()('k prior, to the exchange, it appears 
The more familiar fundamental corpo-
rate changes, merger, consolidation" and 
dissolution, are accompanied by statutory 
and judicial safeguards established to pro-
tect minority shareholders. (Corp.Code, §§ 
4100-4124, 4600-4693.) Shareholders dis; 
senting from a merger of their corporation' 
into another may demand that the corpo-
ration purchase their shares at the fair 
market value. (Corp.Code, § 4300.) If 
the .shareholders and the corporation fail to 
agree on that value, 'the shareholders may 
call upon the court, which may in turn ap-
point" independent appraisers to - assist in 
evaluating the shares. (Corp.Code, §§ 4306, 
4308, 4310.) This procedure makes possi-
ble determination of value unaffected 'by 
any market distortion caused by the merger 
(Gallois v. West End Chemical Co., 185 Cal. 
App.2d 765; 8 Cal.Rptr. 596) and enables 
stockholders iIi a closely held corporation 
whose shares are not publicly marketed to 
obtain an- independent judgment as to the 
value of their shares. Protection- of share-
holder interests is achieved in voluntary 
corporate dissolution by judicial supervision 
to assure equitable settlement of the corpo-
ration's -affairs. (Corp.Code, § 4607; In 
re Security Finance Co., supra, ~9 Ca1.2d 
370, 317 P.2d I.) 
JudiCial protection has also been afford-
ed th~"; ~hareholder who is the victim of a 
"de-ta.~to merger" to which he objects. 
In Fa~ris v. Glen' Alden Corporation, 393 
Pa. 42~, 143 A.2d 25, the Supreme Court of 
"1', ' 
Pennu'lvania extended the -right thereto-
fo~e ,~iven to shareholders dissenting from 
a metg~r to the shareholders of a corpora-
tion th'lt had agreed to acquite all of the 
", I 
assets ;of another corporation in exchange 
for siock. The court noted that while 
shareholders were not entitled under the 
Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law to 
that this company was privately held for 
the benefit of the, Ahmanson family. 
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dissent if the corporation acquired the as· 
sets of another corporation without more, 
where the transaction had the effect of a 
merger the shareholders should have been 
given the rights of dissent and appraisal. 
Appraisal rights protect the dissenting 
minority shareholder against being forced 
to either remain an investor in an enter-
prise fundamentally different than that in 
which he invested or sacrifice his invest-
ment by sale of his share~ at less than a 
fair value. (O'Neal and Derwin, Ex-
pulsion or Oppression of Business Asso-
ciates (1961), supra, 62.) Plaintiff here 
was entitled to no less. But she was en-
titled to more. In the circumstances of this 
case she should have heen accorded the 
same opportunity to exchange her Asso-
ciation stock for that of United Financial 
accorded the majority. 
Although a controlling shareholder who 
sells or exchanges his shares is not under 
an obligation to obtain for the minority the 
consideration that he receives in all cases, 
when he does sell or exchange his shares 
the transaction is subject to close s·crutiny. 
When the majority receives a premium 
over market value for its shares, the con-
sideration for which that premium is paid 
will be examined. If it reflects payment 
for that which is properly a corporate asset 
all shareholders may demand to share pro-
portionately. (Perlman v. Feldmann, su-
pra, 219 F.2d 173.) Here the exchange was 
an integral part of a scheme that the de-
fendants could reasonably foresee would 
have as an incidental effect the destruction 
of the potential public market for Associa-
tion stock. The remaining stockholders 
would thus be deprived of the opportunity 
to realize a profit from those intangible 
characteristics that attach to publicly mar-
keted stock and enhance its value above 
book value. Receipt of an appraised value 
reflecting book value and earnings alone 
could not compensate the ~inority share-
holders for the loss of this potential. Since 
the damage is real, although the amount is 
speculative, equity demands that the minor-
ity stockholders be placed in a position at 
least as favorable as that the majority cre-
ated for themselves. 
If, after trial of the cause, plaintiff has 
established f~cts in conformity with the al-
legations of the complaint and stipulation, 
then upon tender of her Association stock 
to defendants she will be entitled to receive 
at her election either the appraised value of 
her shares on the date of the exchange, 
May 14, 1959, with interest at 7 percent a 
year from the date of this action or a sum 
equivalent to the fair market value of a "de_ 
rived block" of United Financial stock 
on the date of this action with interest 
thereon from t11at date.,.and the sum of 
. $927.50 (the return of capital paid to the 
original United Financial shareholders) 
with interest thereon from the date United 
Financial first . made such payments to its 
original shareholders, for each share ten-
dered. The appraised or fair market value 
shall be reduced, however, by the amount 
by which dividends paid on Association 
shares during the period from May 14, 
1959 to the present exceeds the dividends 
paid on a corresponding block of United 
Financial shares during the same period. 
V 
The Cartwright Act 
[8] Plaintiff contends that the stipu-
lated facts and the allegations of the com-
plaint also state a cause of action for re-
straint of trade in violation of the Cart-
wright Act. (Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 16720-
16758.) That Act makes unlawful any 
"t";st" (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16726), de-
fined as 'a "combination of capital, skill or 
acts by two or more persons for [inter alia] 
the following purposes: (a) To create or 
carry out restrictions in trade or commerce. 
* * * (c) To prevent competition in 
* * * purchase of * * * any com-
modity." (BllS. & Prof.Code, § 16720.) De-
fendants do not contend that shares of stock 
are not a commodity within the contempla-
. tion of the Legislature when it adopted the 
Cartwright Act. We assume arguendo that 
the Cartwright Act applies to transactions 
in corporate shares. 
Plaintiff has alleged that "the Delaware 
Exchange comprised an agreement to com-
bine and a combination of the participants' 
capital and interest in Association guaran-
tee stock which prevented and precluded 
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free and unrestricted competition among 
themselves in the purchase of a com~ 
modity, ,to wit: ASSOCIATION guaran-
tee stock." (Complaint, par. IIr.) Read 
in conjunction 'with the further allegation 
that defendants comprised 95 percent of the 
market for guarantee stock' the complaint 
thus alleges ill substance that the effect of 
the defendants' action was to prevent com-
petition in the only -existing market for 
Association stock. The complaint does not 
allege, however, that thi,s was a purpose 
of the defendants' actions or that defend-
ants agreed among themselves 'not 'to pur-
chase further shares of Association stock 
from the minority stockholders. Even ac-
corded the liberal <:onstruction of plead-
ings required by section 452 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, the .allegations ,of the' com-
plaint when read in their entirety fail to 
supply the necessary element of purpose, 
A cause of action for restraint of trade un-
der the Cartwright Act or common law 
principles must allege both·3 purpose to 
restrain trade and injury, to the business of 
the ,plaintiff traceable to actions in fur-
therance of that purpose. (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 16756; Speegle v. Board of Fire 
Underwriters, 29 Cal2d 34, 41, 172 P.2d 
867; Willis .v. Santa .Ana .etc. Hospital 
Assn., 58 Ca1.2d 806, 808, 8\0, 26 Cal.Rptr. 
640, 376 P.2d 568.) 
lack of factual allegations of specific con-
duct directed toward, furtherance of a COII-
spiracy to eliminate or reduce competition ' 
in the trading of Association stock renders 
the complaint insufficient (Chicago Title 
Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., 
69 Ca1.2d 305, 327, 70 Cal.Rptr. 849, 444 
P.2d 481.) 
VI 
. Defendants' Appeal 
[9] Defendants appeal from the judg-
ment uonly with respect'to the overruling 
," by the court of the * * * specifications 
, of" th~ demurrer based on lach,es, uncer"" 
tainty in designation of the identity and 
number of persons constituting the class 
plaintiff purports to represent, and failure 
to separately state multiple causes of ac-
tion. An order' overruling a demurrer is 
not appealable. (Code Civ.Proc. § 904.1 
[formerly § %3]. See 3 Witkin, Cal.Pro-
cedure, Appeal, §, 19(a).) Although the' 
judgment· from which defendants appeal 
recites the order overruling the demur-
rer, the order remains interlocutory and 
nonappealable. 
Inasmuch as the questions may arise 
again on appeal from the final judgment, 
·however, we de~m it appropriate to com-
ment on defendants' contentions. 
Although ,it may be siufficie~t in some 
instances to allege solely. the effect of such Laches 
combination from which a purpose to elim- [10] The exchange of Association stock 
inate competition ~ay be inferred, when. as for United Financial stock by defendants 
here, the defendant is alleged to have be- occurred on May 14, 1959. The first pub-
come 'the sole' market for ~hares of stock . lie offering of United Financial stock and 
of a single. closely held corporation and ~' sale, of the debentures followed on or 
purpose unrelated to elimination or' reduc:" abol~t June 10, .1960. United Financial's 
tion of competition - affirmatively appears offe'r ,to the minority stockholders to pur-
on the face of the complaint no 'such infer- chase ,their ~tock was made in September 
ence will be drawn. Failure of the plain- 196Q. The application for a permit to ex-' 
tiff to allege either an agreement -among change United Financial shares for! As-
the defendants not to purchase shares 'of soci~tion stock held by the minority stock-
Association stock for their own accounts holders was filed ,on August 21, 1961 and 
or that this was a purPose of the transfer the hearings thereon were held on Sep-
of their shares to United Financial rel1- tember 29 and October 11, 1961. United 
ders the complaint insufficient insofar Financial's request that the application be 
as it purports to state a cause of action withdrawn followed. The plaintiff com-
for relief under the Cartwright Act The menced this action on January 30, 1962. 
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The delay in initiating this action was 
not so long as to be unreasonable and to 
constitute laches as a matter of law. It 
is well established that mere lapse of time 
without showing of prejudice to the de-
fendant does not constitute laches. (Ger-
hard v. Stephens, 68 Cal.2d 864, 904, 69 
Cal.Rptr. 612, 442 P.2d 692; Beverage v. 
Canton Placer Mining Co., 43 Cal.2d 769, 
777, 278 P.2d 694; Magoire v. Hibernia 
Say. & Loan Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719, 746, 146 
P.2d 673, lSI A.L.R. 1062; McGibbon v. 
Schmidt, 172 Cal. 70, 74, ISS P. 460.) 
Since prejudice to the defendants does not 
appear from the complaint and stipulated 
facts, the order of the trial court overrul-
ing the demurrer on that ground was 
proper. 
The Class Represented by Plaintiff 
[11] Defendants complain that plain-
tiff's definition of the class she purports 
-to represent as "all of that portion of the 
other minority stockholders who are simi-
larly situated who wish to rely thereon and 
who agree to compensate Plainti f£ and 
her attorneys for reasonable attorneys' fees 
in an amount to be determined by the 
Court after trial" is "too i11-defined and 
ephemeral in make-up" to constitute a class 
for the purpose of a class action. They 
base this contention on the holding of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit in Giordano v. Radio Cor-
poration of America, 183 F.2d 558, 560-
561, that a class composed of persons who 
"are in agreement with the plaintiff" -can-
not constitute a class for this purpose. 
Defendants' reliance on that case is mis-
placed. Plaintiff here desigoates the class 
as the minority stockholders of the Asso-
ciation. Those similarily situated are easily 
identified as all of those persons who con-
tinued to hold Association stock subse-
quent to the defendants' exchange of shares 
for United Financial shares. There is no 
s1!-ggestion that the class is limited to per-
sons who agree with the plaintiff. The 
further identification of the class as those 
persons who agree to share in plaintiff's 
litigation expense does no more than state 
the applicable rule with regard to equitable 
apportionment of the litigation expenses in-
curred by a plaintiff who successfully 
prosecutes an action on behalf of a class. 
(Spragoe v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 
161, 166, S9 S.C!. 777, 83L.Ed. 1184; 
Estate of Reade, 31 Cal.2d 669, 672, 191 P. 
2d 745; Farmers etc. Nat. Bank of Los 
Angeles v. Peterson,S Cal.2d 601, 607, 55 
P.2d 867.) 
The rule of this jurisdiction with respect 
to class actions is found in section 382 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, which pro-
vides in relevant part: "* * * when 
the question is one of a common or gen-
eral interest, of many persons. or when the 
parties are numerous. and it is imprac-
ticable to bring them all before the Court, 
one or more may sue or defend for the 
benefit of all." We have held that the two 
requisites of a class action under this 
section are an "ascertainable class * * * 
and * * * a well defined community of 
interest in the questions of law and fact 
involved affecting the parties to be repre-
sented." (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 
2d 695, 704, 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 
732, 739.) It is apparent that the requisite 
community of interest exists among the 
minority shareholders of the Association 
and that the class is readily ascertainable. 
The demurrer was properly overruled. 
Our holding that plaintiff's complaint 
fails to state a canse of action for restraint 
of trade disposes of defendants' further 
contention that the complaint fails to sep-
arately state multiple causes of action. 
The judgment appealed from by plain-
ti ff is reversed. The trial court is directed 
to overrule the demurrer in conformity 
with this opinion. Defendants' appeal is 
dismissed. 
PETERS, TOBRINER, BURKE, and 
SULLIVAN, JJ., and COUGHLIN, J. pro 
tem.,* concur. 
* Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
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McCOMB, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. I would affirm the judgment 
in favor of defendants for the reasons 
expressed by Mr. Justice Shinn and Mr. 
Justice Moss in the opinions prepared by 
thelll for the Court of Appeal in Jones v. 
H. F. Ahmanson & Company (Cal.App.) 
76 Cal.Rptr. 293. 
Rehearing denied; McCOMB, J., dis-
senting. 
COUGHLIN, J., sitting pro tem: in place 
of. MOSK, J., who deemed himself dis-
qualified. 
w 
o : m lUMBER SYSUM , 
81 Cal.Rptr. 609 
In ro Darryl Thoma. KEMP 
on Habeas Corpus. 
Cr. 13136. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Nov. 14, 1969. 
Petitioner sought writ of habeas cor-
pus. The Supreme Court, Peters, J., held 
that where at least 10 of 12 jurors were 
excluded without determination that they 
would automatically vote against imposi-
tion of capital punishment without regard 
to any evidence' developed at trial, judg-
ment imposing death penalty had to be re-
versed. 
Judgment imposing death penalty va-
cated, and case remanded for new penalty 
trial; balance of judgment affirmed. 
McComb, ]., dissented. 
I. Abatement a.d Revival ¢=>8(2) 
Fact that accused was ordered by su-
perior court produced for purpose of sani-
ty hearing and that sanity prOceeding was 
still pending would not preclude Supreme 
Court fropt determining validity ,of ac-
cused's conviction on petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. West's Ann.Pen.Code, 
§ 3701. 
2. Crlml.allaw ¢=>1166V,(6) 
Where at least 10 of 12 jurors were 
excluded without determination that they 
460 P.2d-31 
would automatically vote against imposi-, 
tion of capital punishment without regard 
to any. evidence developed at trial, judg-
ment imposing death penalty had to be re-
versed. 
3. Crlml.al law _94 
Where prosecution's expert witness, a 
psychiatrist, testified that accused was ful-
ly conscious when he committed crimes of 
murder, rape and kidnapping and had no 
brain injury -and had ability to premeditate, 
and deliberate and where crimes concerned 
rape and murder of nurse in her apartment, 
rape of woman to whom accused had of-
fered ride home and kidnapping and rape 
of woman who was driving through park 
and where psychiatrist testified that ac-
cused's motive was sexual gratification, 
jury could properly find that accused was 
capable of specific intent required for the 
crimes. 
4. Homicide ¢=>347 
Court would not exercise its power to 
reduce conviction from first-degree to 
second-degree murder for accused, who 
raped and -murdered nurse in her apart-
ment West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1181, subd. 
6. 
Marshall, Busby & Clark and Dwain 
Clark, Los Angeles,- for petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., John T. 
Murphy and Horace Wheatley, Deputy 
Attys. Gen., for respondent. 
PETERS, Justice. 
Darryl Thomas Kemp, under sentence of 
death for murder, petitions for a writ of 
habeas corpus. The writ must be granted 
as to the penalty under the rules announc-
ed in'Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968),391 U. 
S. 510, 88 S.C!. 1770,20 L.Ed.2d 776, but de-
nied insofar as the petition seeks to attack 
the judgment of guilt. 
[1] Petitioner was convicted after a 
jury trial of one count of murder of the 
first degree, two counts of rape, and one 
count of kidnapping. He was found by the 
jury to have been sane at the time of the 
